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Abstract
Where the contracts are incomplete, the resulting co-ordination problems may be attenu-
ated if workers are intrinsically motivated to do the work.
It is established by theoretical and empirical literature that workers within public orga-
nizations are intrinsically motivated to exert effort doing the job and have a strong sense of
social agents with the mission of providing collective goods to citizens and tax payers.
This paper is an empirical pilot study in the health care sector using methods of Qualitative
Analysis research. We run semistructured interviews a`-la-Bewley to sixteen physicians of
Navarre’s health Care Servicio Navarro de Salud-Osasunbidea (SNS-O). The objective of the
work is twofold: first, to find empirical evidence about doctors’ non-monetary motives and
second, to find evidence about how these non-monetary motives shape doctors’ behavior.
We formulate several testable hypotheses: (1) Doctors are intrinsically motivated agents, (2)
Economic incentives and control policies may crowd-out intrinsic motivation and (3) Well
designed incentives may crowd-in agents intrinsic motivation.
Results confirm the hypotheses formulated above and coming from our theoretical findings
[11], [12]. Finally, we also found empirical evidence of conflict between political advisors or
health managers (principals) and physicians (agents). Results are a step forward in the optimal
design of incentive schemes and policies which crowd in doctors’ intrinsic motivation.
Keywords: qualitative research, interviews, intrinsic motivation, crowding effects.
JEL Codes: D03, D86.
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Here is the truth: if you want people to do something, you really
need to understand what motivates them. That is the key:
once you understand what people value, then you can use
incentives to work in predictable ways, and you can get people
(including yourself) to behave in ways that you want them to.
[The Way Axis. Uri Gneezy and John A. List, 2013, p. 31.]
1 Introduction
Recent theoretical and empirical literature in economics has shown that economic agents
act beyond the self-interest and have other motivations than the pure monetary. Contrary
to the standard economic model starred by the homo economicus, a vast experimental,
empirical and theoretical literature on Behavioral Economics1 has shown that motives like
social preferences 2, intrinsic motivation3, or corporate culture (identity, social norms, values
and ethics)4 among others, play a key role in the economic decisions of economic agents.
However, mainstream contract theory and the theory of incentives have neglected the
role of such motivations [34]. The study of contract incompleteness and optimal incentives
has rested on the standard economic assumptions of economic behavior. Thus economic
theory on adverse selection and moral hazard in organizations has generated a wide range
of results many of which failed in their predictions in contexts where motivations beyond
the maximization of the economic profits emerge5.
It is well established that social organizations6 pursue goals and objectives which are
not necessarily profitable in monetary terms [58]. Moreover, usually the motivation of
agents who work for these organizations goes beyond the expected monetary gain. They
1For a depth review see [19], [20], [35] and [37].
2See for instance [8], [17] and [36].
3See [7], [18], [28], [31] and [38].
4See [1],[21], [24], [41], [42], [44], [53], [54] and [56].
5See for instance [36], [39], [45] and [49].
6We will refer as social organizations to those organizations which are state or publicly owned and whose
goal is to provide a collective good like health, education, social services, civil safety, emergency services.
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are social agents, intrinsically motivated for work and with a strong self view as pro-social
agents. They enjoy from simply doing the work and view themselves as a part of a whole
system that seeks to maximize the social welfare providing education, health care, public
services and so on. Thus monetary incentives implemented in accordance with the standard
economic theory might not work properly because agents’ behavior is also shaped by other
motives in addition to the monetary and material ones.
However, despite the huge amount of theoretical and experimental work, the lack of em-
pirical and field research and also the lack of natural experiments leave behavioral economics
unbalanced in its approach to the Economics of Organizations and Incentives. There are
some works that approach the topic empirically7; but, as a discipline, there is a lack of
empirical support of the new theoretical predictions, and also of the experimental findings.
Our work is aimed at throwing some light in this empirical test of theoretical implications
on the topic. Specifically, we aim to test the theoretical implications drawn from our previ-
ous work [11, 12]. Given the inherent difficulty to obtain data about intrinsic motivation,
identity and related concepts, we relied upon Qualitative Research methods.
The objective of this work is to seek empirical evidence from the field with the goal
of improving the existing theories and/or developing new theory on Behavioral Economics
and Behavioral Contract Theory. More precisely, the objective is twofold: first, we aim to
find evidence in the field about intrinsic motivation and second, we aim to find evidence
about how these motivations affect agents’ decisions and attitudes towards work through
crowding effects. We frame the research into health care organizations where, presumably,
agents (physicians) are intrinsically motivated to work in the provision of health. More
precisely, the hypotheses that we are seeking to test in this application to the health care
are the following: (1) Doctors are intrinsically motivated agents, (2) Economic incentives
and control and command policies may crowd out doctors’ intrinsic motivation and (3)
7See [55], [5] or [43]
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There are other incentives that may crowd in agents intrinsic motivation.
Finding confirmatory evidence on the above hypotheses may help us to inform decision
makers about the optimal design of incentives, regulations and policies which will lead to
better outcomes. Borrowing the words of Gnezzy and List (2013) “Once we understand what
people value and why, we can develop effective incentives and use them to [. . . ], motivate
employees” (doctors). We forecast that in the case of health this better outcomes could
be an improvement in the efficiency and the effectiveness with which health services are
provided and an improvement in the quality of health services.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the methods. Section 2.1.
describes the interviews. Section 2.2. describes the analysis of the data. Section 3 shows
the results. In section 3.1. we describe results on intrinsic motivation. In section 3.2. we
describe results on crowding-out. In section 3.3. we describe results on crowding-in. Section
3.4. incorporates some additional results. Finally section 4 offers concluding remarks.
2 Methods
2.1 Interviews
We performed in-depth semi-structured interviews a`-la-Bewley [13] to physicians at Sistema
Navarro de Salud (SNS) (n=16). Interviews were undertaken over a sixteen-month period
starting in February 2010. The questions addressed were open-ended and were written
based on new theories coming from Behavioral Economics Literature: intrinsic motivation
and crowding effects, identity, corporate culture and economics of information.
The place, date and time of the interview were always agreed with the interviewees.
Fixing date process is very important in order to obtain high-quality data. Our main goal in
dating always was to agree on a day and a time when the interviewee would have enough time
and no other commitments (professional, family duties, or other) waiting. We first started
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performing the interviews at the Department of Economics at Public University of Navarre.
We met with the interviewee in a quiet, calm and confortable room in order to create a
wellcoming atmosphere that will facilitate the natural course of the interview. But soon we
realized that moving to the respondents’ workplace would be a better strategy. Thus, we
performed the rest of interviews at doctors’ workplace, usually in their personal offices. This
strategy eased the dating process and resulted in a more natural and spontaneous behavior
from doctors during the interviews. Anyway, in all cases doctors, themselves, decided on
location, time and day of the interview.
Doctors were invited to take part in the research through a formal invitation letter8.
The letter briefly informed on the contents of the meeting although no details about the
research goals were given to avoid biasing doctors’ answers. Letter was sent jointly with a
document of anonimity and confidentiality commitment9. We asked doctors openly talk and
judge the health care and the health organization for which they were working and therefore
we guaranteed anonimity in order to get sincere and honest reviews. We allowed doctors
a great deal of freedom in answering to our questions. Doctors were keen on participating
in the research and they were happy to have the opportunity to openly give their view
about the state of the question. They openly showed their opinion in relation to the health
care managers and their management practices. We believe that the main reason why they
cooperated was the pleasure of talking to external academics about what they do day after
day in their jobs. Most people like to talk about themselves. This is a fact from which is
important to take advantage making interviews fun and interesting.
The duration of the interviews ranged from a minimun of 57 minutes to a maximun
of 1 hour and 44 minutes. All interviews were performed by two of the authors (MB and
JMC) and were recorded using a mp4 recorder/player10. Despite it is very time consuming,
8Available from the authors upon request.
9Available from the authors upon request
10Samsung YP-T10
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we personally did the interviews because it is very important to take notes at the field.
As long as the interviews progress, interviewees make gestures, show emotions or feelings
through face expressions, change their voice tone and volume in relation with the question
they are exposing and transmit changes in their mood. To capture all these details improves
significatively the quality of data but requires the researchers presence in the interview in
order to take notes. After the field work done at the moment of the interview, we transcribed
the recorded audio to text document sentence by sentence. We typed all transcriptions as
soon as possible after the interview. This allowed us to remember, with the help of all
notes taken at field, all the details of the interview. This way we loss the minimun relevant
information and keep as high as possible the quality of obtained data.
All interviewees were doctors working at SNS-O. Our selection criteria was to meet with
highly qualified professionals, in high responsibility positions, and with long tenure within
health care system. Consequently all but one were experienced senior staff, mostly men
(fourteen out of sixteen), from a wide range of services. All but three were working at
hospitals. The remaining were working or have worked to a private health care organization
under public concertation, and in primary care centers.
2.2 Analysis
Analysis stacks the information within categories and codes [23]. By category we mean
“the higher-level concepts under which analysts group other lower level concepts according
to shared properties”, [23]. Categories represent the relevant phenomena that enables the
analyst to group whithin them the data coming from the qualitative concepts or evidence
from field. Categories are the dependent variables in the work. Categories are the outcomes
produced and explained by qualitative data. We ordered the categories involved in this
work as follows: (i) Intrinsic Motivation, (i.a) Crowding out, (i.b) Crowding in, (ii) Identity,
(ii.a) Socialization and (ii.b) Conflict.
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Codes are labels used to concentrate and homogeneize interviewees’ statements or quotes.
In each code homogeneous statements are grouped and all of them refer to a concept which
is related to a category. Each statement belonging to a given code is an observation. Taken
together, all observations belonging to a given code determine the strength with which such
a code serves as evidence for a given category.
Codes are of two types: deductive and inductive. Deductive codes are those which
have been defined and labelled on the basis of existing theories and literature on the topic
(category) that it is being analyzed. Think for instance in a code labeled as autonomy. Self
Determination Theory (SDT) [31], [28], [29] has established that autonomy (decision and
action) acts as a fuel for intrinsic motivation. Thus, we use a code labelled autonomy to
group under it all statements which allude to autonomy in relation to intrinsic motivation
or other category. Analogously, when the code emerged spontaneously from respondents’
statements, then we classify it as inductive code. For instance, doctors frequently say that
economic incentives are effective only in the short run: ‘[...] people adapt to extra money
[‘...]”, “[...] internalize extra earnings [...]”, “[...] game the system and want more and
more [...]”,. . . . Then, we label a code with the word “Short run” to group under it all the
statements which deal with the short-termed effectiveness of economic incentives.
Sometimes inductive codes are called “In-vivo” [15]. This is so when we label a code
with a word that is of widespread use by informants in the course of the research to refer to
one specific fact or circumstance. For instance, doctors often use the expression “Café para
todos” 11 to point out that some incentives implemented in the SNS neither discriminate,
nor differenciate and, consequently, do not recognize doctors who work at high level effort,
interest and quality from those who simply meet the minimun. Then, we label the code
with the exact words used by respondents to caught and count all those statements and
other ones with the same meaning.
11For the remaining of the work, the traslation to English of such an expression, coffee for all will be used
to refer to the mentioned code
8
A descriptive analysis and some quantification are shown within each category. We
explore the number of times and the frequency by which a given code appears into the
respondents’ discourse, the number of respondents who refer to a given code in relation
to a given category, or the observed pairwise correlation between codes in reference to a
given category. Some tables, figures and diagrams showing quantification will be displayed
to support results from the qualitative analysis. Some additonal analysis has been done
and more conclusions drawn from the classification of all the statements into Positive or
Normative.
We organized data using two kinds of documents: a set of commented transcriptions
and a set of spreadsheets. In the first, we add notes at the margin of each transcription
document. In each note we emphasize a quote from the transcription. We label the selected
quote with codes. We relate those codes with categories to underline the connection between
the informats’ statements and categories. We point out the code and the category each
quote belongs to. Figure 1 shows a piece of a commented transcription. These commented
transcription documents are the first step in the data analysis.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[…]  cambiamos  un  poco  el modelo  ¿no?  en  vez  de  hacer…  o  sea  hasta  ahora  lo clásico eran las peonadas ¿no? pues tu tienes lista de espera y te proponen hacer peonadas  ¿no?  para  intentar  bajar  la  lista  de  espera.  Entonces  bueno  pues  tu, simplemente  haces  la  peonada  y  si  luego  la  lista  de  espera  baja  o  no…  no  es problema tuyo. Te da lo mismo. Se supone que va  a bajar ¿no? pero, pero… si tu en una  tarde  en  una  peonada  ves  a  veinte  pacientes,  si  los  ves  rápidamente,  los vuelves  a  recitar  ¿no?  les  resuelves  el  problema,  la  lista  de  espera  habrá  bajado ¿no? porque… tu has visto a esos pacientes que estaban en la lista de espera, pero lo  que  has  hecho  igual  es  trasladar  el  problema  a  dentro  de  tres  meses  ¿no? entonces bueno. Nosotros un poco cambiamos el modelo ¿no? Lo que hacia era la dirección nos planteaba una serie de objetivos ¿no? y nos decía pues bueno, si al final de año cumplís estos objetivos, os pagaremos esto, que venía a ser un poco el equivalente a lo que los otros años nos habían pagado en peonadas, ¿no? Entonces bueno  pues  un  poco,…  vale,…  pues  lo  planteamos  ¿no?  había  objetivos  que  eran cuantitativos ¿no? reducción de lista de espera etc., etc.   Y otros eran cualitativos ¿no? de… pues de sistemas de mejora etc., etc.  
Mikel Berdud   16/1/14 14:54
Mikel Berdud   16/1/14 14:54
Mikel Berdud   16/1/14 14:54
Mikel Berdud   16/1/14 14:54
Comentario: Motivación Intrínseca/Crowding out: Incentivo económico; peonadas. 
Comentario: Identidad/Conflicto: Distancia; conflicto de interés; Si la lista de espera no baja… no es problema tuyo. 
Comentario: Identidad/Socialización: Compartir objetivos; Sentirse parte/Pactar objetivos; la dirección nos planteaba una serie de objetivos ¿no? y nos decía pues bueno, si al final de año cumplís estos objetivos, os pagaremos esto… 
Comentario: Motivación Intrínseca/Crowding In: Incentivo económico+Autonomía; Autonomía/pactar objetivos; la dirección nos planteaba una serie de objetivos ¿no? y nos decía pues bueno, si al final de año cumplís estos objetivos, os pagaremos esto,. 
Figure 1: An example of a commented transcription document.
Next, we transfer all these data from commented transcriptions to spreadsheets. A
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first spreadsheet contains an individual sheet per respondent. We sort quotes in rows, and
categories and codes in columns. For every quote we proceed filling with 1 the cells corre-
sponding with the codes and the category present in it and we fill with a 0 the remaining.
This way we generate a 0-1 matrix for each respondent that allows us to quantify and collect
information from interviews.
A second spreadsheet is built to analyze the data and the quantification provided by
first one. A single sheet is built for each category in which we develop a general 0-1 matrix
for this category. This allows us to count the times that each code appears in the course
of interviews related to a given category and also to set interconnections between codes
counting the number of times that emerge jointly in reference to a given category. Using
these inter-code relationships we establish a simple hierarchy between codes. Finally, we
generate other sheet in which we do calculations with all the quantified data. For each
category, we develop a series of tables showing the probability of appearance of a given
category conditional to the positive or normative nature. This sheet also shows lists − one
for each code − with the number of respondents who mention at least one time a given
codes in relation to a given category.
We define 37 codes which are brieﬄy explained in the glossary. As we said before, we
classify each quote as positive or normative. In the case of a respondent’s statement is a
descriptive answer about health organization, conditions at workplace, or the health care
sector, we classify it as positive. Contrary, if the statement has to do with the subjective
view that respondent has about how the work, health organization and health care should
be managed and organized, then we classify it as normative. If a code appears almost all
times as normative in the interviewees discourses, then we interpret this as a signal showing
which changes shold be implemented within the health care organizations from the point
of view of the physicians. Analogously, if a given code appears almost all times as positive,
then we interpret this as a signal of the actual state of the picture concerning health care
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organizations at the moment in which the research was done.
We analyze data seeking evidence about physicians’ intrinsic motivation and evidence
of crowding effects: crowding-in and crowding-out. In the case of intrinsic motivation we
want to answer if doctors are intrinsically motivated professionals. However, for crowding
effects we are interested in setting which of the current policies, incentives or regulations
implemented in the health care organization of health can be considered of being crowding-
out or crowding-in. Analyzing informants’ proposals and experiences we also try to suggest
ideas and proposals of innovative and implementable crowding in incentives, policies and
regulations.
3 Results
A total number of 594 statements concerning to intrinsic motivation and crowding effects
were drawn from interviews. Figure 2 shows the distribution of all these statements by
categories.
Figure 2: Crowding Out and economic incentives: distribution respondent by respondent.
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3.1 Intrinsic Motivation
All interviewed physicians reported directly or indirectly intrinsically motivated actions
and/or behaviors. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the number of intrinsic motivation
arguments mentioned by each interviewee.
Figure 3: Number of intrinsic motivation statements distribution respondent by respondent.
Table 1 shows in the first column the codes which capture doctors’ statements when
they refer to intrinsic motivation. The second column shows the number of doctors who
mention at least once statements referring to each code joint with the percentage between
brackets. Third column shows the number and the percentage of statements belonging to
each code.
All interviewees made statements showing their joy from practicing medicine. We cap-
ture all these statements into the code like/enjoy. Almost all doctors pointed out that
vocation drove they to medical practice. Humanity, or being effective in alleviating human
suffering was also pointed out as an inherent reward by almost all doctors. Other medi-
cal specific tasks also appeared frequently in interviews as attractive for doctors: service,
science, research or help. Finally, there are arguments caught by codes that are important
although to a lesser extent. However, all of them share in common that physicians have
inner motivations beyond the monetary which encourage them for work. From doctors’
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Table 1:
Are Physicians Intrinsically Motivated Professionals?
Code Respondents 16 (%) Statements 250 (%)
Like/Enjoy 16 (100,00%) 192 (76,80%)
Vocation 15 (93,75%) 48 (19,20%)
Humanity 15 (93,75%) 77 (30,80%)
Attractive profession 15 (93,75%) 91 (36,40%)
Service 13 (81,25%) 64 (25,60%)
Science 13 (81,25%) 61 (34,40%)
Technical knowledge 11 (68,75%) 27 (10,80%)
Further education 10 (62,50%) 26 (10,40%)
Recognition 10 (62,50%) 15 (6,00%)
Professional Development 9 (56,25%) 10 (4,00%)
Research 8 (50,00%) 21 (8,40%)
Challenge 8 (50,00%) 18 (7,20%)
Effort 8 (50,00%) 16 (6,40%)
Relatedness 7 (43,75%) 15 (6,00%)
Prestige 7 (43,75%) 10 (4,00%)
Passion 6 (37,50%) 12 (4,80%)
Empathy 6 (37,50%) 11 (4,40%)
Help 5 (31,25%) 12 (4,80%)
Pro-social 5 (31,25%) 7 (2,80%)
Dedication 5 (31,25%) 10 (4,00%)
Altruism 4 (25,00%) 6 (2,40%)
Teaching 4 (25,00%) 5 (2,00%)
Table 1: the number of respondents who reported at least one statement of each code
and the percentage of respondents who reported statements of each code. Also the number of
statements within each code and their percentage of appearance relative to the total number
of statements.
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statements we conlude that they are intrinsically motivated agents who like the medical
practice or enjoy just from working as physicians.
Like/enjoy group doctors’ explanations which show their interest or joy towards the
medical practice. All respondents mentioned at least one time a statement related with this
code.
“...medical practice... is a practice in which... intellectual profits, affective profits are
obtained quickly.”
Respondent 1
“I find it very enjoyable to learn medicine and practice medicine when [. . . ] working as a
physician. You do the things that attract you and if you like windsurfing [. . . ] you are cold
but you don’t feel it because you are doing windsurf. ”
Respondent 13
Vocation is another inner motivation that doctors feel. Doctors perceive themselves as
innerly and innately oriented to medical practice.
“within emergency, I am not looking for anyone to thank me anything, is my work and is
what I want to do, then, I am happy just because I am doing it, what I have chosen.”
Respondent 8
“I remember going into a hospital and it was a feeling... you feel that this is your place.”
Respondent 15
Humanity is a key feature that characterizes doctors. Doctors report that they enjoy
and/or are vocationally driven to improve humans welfare and health. Humans and their
wellbeing are what almost all physicians feel to be a fundamental motivation who encourages
good work and is beyond money. They have a sense of being public servants who contribute
to people’s welfare.
“I have experienced that people suffer much more with psychological things than with phys-
ical pain. Whereupon... I want to be physician to relieve suffering and given that the greatest
suffering that there exist is the psychological suffering I dedicate myself to this.”
Respondent 11
14
Service reflect the experienced joy from treating patients and helping them, is another
reason of being intrinsically motivated behaviors drew from doctors explanations. We fre-
quently found such reasons in their words.
“it is a global system ehm, so... that is... precisely the service... I understand it unseparable
from teaching and from research, clinical... where you see the problems that you have read,
that you have seen, you think about them and you research on them... is very attractive.”
Respondent 14
Science and research, also seems to be key factors in the non-monetary motivations of
doctors.
“I like also what I can do in research [. . . ] this overeffort, what I do because I like it also,
right? because actually this do not... that is, I do not gain anything, or little, from that [. . . ]
prestige or so if you want or open doors toward [. . . ] new worlds, new perspectives”
Respondent 2
Doctors’ reported evidence about intrinsic motivation can be classified into two families
of codes: a first family having to do with psychological determinants that predispose doctors
toward medical practice, and a second family including codes that encompass those tasks
and features of the medical profession that doctors like most to perform. We treat the first
family of codes as the main psychological and personal causes of doctors’ intrinsic motivation
toward medical practice, that is, internal rewards that keep doctors motivated for work. On
the other hand, we treat the second family as the means to display, apply and keep high
that intrinsic motivation. In other words, the ways to perform in medical practice feeling
joy from working at the field.
Figure 4 displays the first family of codes and their interconnections. This family in-
cludes six codes classified into two levels. A first level containing like/enjoy and vocation, the
two main codes which explain doctors’ intrinsic motivation, and a second level containing
the other four codes which are closely related with the main two: humanity, attractive pro-
fession, relatedness, and challenge. In the second family we include codes which encompass
the specifical tasks and/or features liked to perform by doctors: service, help, dedication,
15
Intrinsic
Motivation
250
Vocation
48
Like/Enjoy
192
(7)
(48) (192)
Humanity 77 Attractive
Profession 91
Challenge
18
Relatedness
15
(15) (77)(10)
(68)
(15) (13)
Figure 4: Numbers within nodes represent the number of quotes of the code. Numbers
between brackets displayed in arrows represent the number of times that the codes connected
by the arrow are quoted jointly. Dashed arrows connect codes. Continuous arrows connect
the two main codes with the Intrinsic Motivation category.
empathy, research, science, technical knowledge, professional development, further education
or teaching, among others.
Table 2: Intrinsic Motivation.
Which are the Determinants of Physicians’ Intrinsic Motivation?
Code Like/Enjoy (192) Percentage
Science 58 30,21%
Service 54 28,12%
Further Education 26 13,54%
Technical knowledge 25 13,02%
Research 20 10,42%
Help/Empathy 18 9,37%
Table 2: the number of times and the frequency with which Like/Enjoy code appear
jointly with other codes referring to tasks and/or features of the medical practice.
Next we analyze the connections that these first family of codes (determinants) have
with the second one. Attending to like/enjoy, some interesting relationships with other
codes are drawn. We summarize the most significative ones in table 2.
As seen in table 2, there seems to be two main dimensions of the medical practice which
jointly form doctor’s intrinsic motivation: the human centered or patient oriented part of the
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Like/Enjoy
192
Human/Patient
Oriented
Science/Technique
Oriented
(70) (149)
Service 67
Help/Empathy
23
Science
61
Further
Education 26
Technical
Knowledge 27
Research
21
(14) (25)
(54)
(20)
(58) (26)
Figure 5: Codes are shown in the circle and ellipse nodes. Rectangle nodes show the
dimensions of intrinsic motivation. Connected with such dimensions the figure shows the codes
that emerge in each case. Numbers between brackets displayed within each node represent the
number of quotes of each code. Numbers between brackets displayed in arrows represent the
number of times that codes allude to each source and the number of times each source explain
doctors’ like/enjoy of medical practice.
profession, and the technical knowledge or scientific advance oriented part of the profession.
Figure 5 shows how these two dimensions relate with the different statements of interviewed
doctors and the codes under these statements.
Doctors reported they enjoy or like medical practice because they help people who suffer
from illness and empthize with them.
“[. . . ] doing something that you like... medicine actually has a part... of helping people
who are... therefore has a portion of reward. ”
Respondent 3
“Not only the technical or the scientific aspect of the profession of the medicine, but also
the human relation. To check that things are going well with some patients and wrong or very
wrong with others... to live such a, such a respect that life gives, right? the death, the birth,
etcetera... eh... anyway, all the affective and emotional delights that may have... that may
have the human relation.”
Respondent 10
Doctors expressed also their joy by practicing medicine, specifically when they face
science oriented medical activities and tasks like research, further education or teaching.
“[. . . ] I think that medicine is extraordinary, there is a beast of a knowledge in a current
moment, the divulgation is tremenduous, the advance... is of a such magnitude that... ”
Respondent 9
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Table 3: Intrinsic Motivation.
Which are the Determinants of Physicians’ Intrinsic Motivation?
Code Vocation (48) Percentage
Service 12 25,00%
Help/Empathy 11 22,91%
Dedication 10 20,83%
Effort 7 14,58%
Pro-social/Altruism 7 14,58%
Table 3: Codes closely related with vocation. Columns show the number of times and
the frequency with which the codes appear jointly with vocation.
“Like a personal challenge, because difficult things attract me more than easy things and,
then I also like the professional challenge, of be able to advance and discover new things, I like
that very much.”
Respondent 6
Vocation, as explained before in this work, also was reported frequently by interviewees
when speaking about the motives which lead them to become doctors. Vocation is a difusse
concept that we use as a code because many times respondents speak about it using this
word literally. However we try to overcome this vagueness of the vocation with other more
precise concepts which jointly appear with it: dedication, effort, service and help among
others. Table 3 shows codes (features and tasks) closely related with vocation.
Table 3 shows that vocation is mainly determined by patient and/or human orientation.
Despite some codes like science or technical knowledge also appear with vocation, we have
omitted them because their frequency of appearance is very low. Therefore, vocation is a
code mainly related with the human or patient oriented part of the medical practice.
Attitudes towards work and the willingness to work out of hours in favor of patients
without any associated payment, are frequently reported statements which have to do with
vocation. Doctors speak not only about their actions and ways to behave but also about
their beliefs on how an ideal physician should behave and the sense of duty she should has.
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“[. . . ] Further, I do things out of my work hours. So well, that doesn’t count [. . . ]. I think
that I work too much. And then, I eat (deal with) all the nasty things that I have. I mean, if
all the patients fall into problems, I go to solve them, right? And yesterday, at the evening I
was (working) until very late, and the day before until eleven at night, fighting with my things,
which are my problems [...]”
Respondent 1
“the doctor should be empathetic, overall empathetic, empathetic. . . he must have a huge
capacity to be empathetic, because you have to put your feet in the shoes of who is suffering,
eh. . . and above of all, I think that you have to be a great communicator.” ’
Respondent 16
Summing up, we conclude that doctors are intrinsically motivated to practice medicine.
They are professionals moved by intrinsic motives. Their professional rewarding system
goes beyond the external and expected monetary gain. From their reporting we can also
draw that they experience pleasure from practicing medicine. Interviews show that doctors
chose medicine moved by a feeling of vocation.
Another interesting finding is that doctors intrinsic motivation seems to be determined
by two separable dimensions: the patient or human oriented professional activity and the
scientific or technique oriented professional activity. In the first dimension, tasks like service
or patient care out of hours and features like help others or be empathetic with patients
seems to be the most important ones. In the second dimension, research activities, teaching,
further education or acquiring technical skills are the most important determinants.
Medical practice is subject to a great amount of responsibility which combines with the
necessity to make decisions with celerity in order to avoid negative health consequences.
Performing in tasks lik service or research produce effective results (relatedness) in saving
lives, alleviate suffering, improve patients’ quality of life and/or extend survival years of
most severe pathologies. Doctors help patients and also be empathetic with patients and
their relatives. They have a strong sense of duty toward performing at high effort level in
their work. All of these ways to behave, emerged in the course of interviews, are shared by
almost all interviewed doctors despite they will not be recognized with any explicit reward
as a consquence.
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3.2 Crowding Out
Evidence about the importance and the causes of the crowding-out effect was also found. In-
terviewees made 157 arguments pointing out crowding-out. Figure 6 shows the distribution
of the number of crowding out arguments mentioned by each interviewee.
Figure 6: Crowding-out statements distribution respondent by respondent.
An observed regular fact that saturates12 rapidly is the crowding out nature of the
economic incentives. Despite respondents in their statements described multiple channels
through which economic incentives may cause crowding out, the fact that money hurts
doctors’ intrinsic motivation was shared by all.
Table 4, shows the number and the percentage of doctos who reported at least once the
codes shown in the first column. For instance, all doctors − sixteen or hundreed percent −
reported that economic incentives cause crowding out. Other codes also shown in the table
are: task meaning change, lack of recognition, ‘coffee for all’, bureaucratization, ‘peonada’ 13
and control, among others. The third column shows the total number and the percentage
12Saturation is a concept of widespread use in Qualitative Analysis Research literature [23]. A code is
saturated when it emerges repeatedly in almost all interviews, and always in the same explanatory or causal
direction.
13The name with which an extra payment scheme implemented by SNS-O is commonly known. This
payment scheme consists in a Fee-For-Service (FFS) payment that is offered to physicians for working out
of hours. The goal of this FFS payment scheme is to reduce waiting lists under a previously determined
threshold.
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Table 4: Crowding out
Do Monetary Incentives and other Command and Control Policies
Crowd out Physicians’ Intrinsic Motivation?
Code Respondents 16 (%) Statements 157 (%)
Economic Incentives 16 (100%) 144 (91,72%)
Task Meaning Change 15 (93,75%) 68 (43,03%)
Lack of Recognition 14 (87,5%) 45 (28,48%)
‘Coffee for All’ 12 (75%) 31 (19,62%)
Bureaucratization 11 (68,75%) 31 (19,62%)
‘Peonada’ (FFS) 11 (68,75%) 23 (14,55%)
Control 11 (68,75%) 21 (13,29%)
Profesional career 9 (56,25%) 13 (8,23%)
Opportunistic Behavior 8 (50%) 21 (13,29%)
Market Transaction 8 (50%) 17 (10,75%)
Lack of Autonomy 7 (43,75%) 12 (7,59%)
Damage to prosocial image 5 (31,25%) 10 (6,32%)
Table 4: The frequency with which respondents indicated the different codes that point
out the existence of crowding out effect and its causes.
of quotes related to each code. For instance, lack of recognition was quoted 68 times out of
the 157 − a 28,48%. As we shall see, most codes shown in table 4 are closely related with
economic incentives and the reasons by which economic incentives cause crowding-out.
Doctors expressed many statements referring to the crowding-out nature of economic
incentives.
“[. . . ] you get used that to develop a given task you need a given economic incentive... and
it is likely to arrive to perverse situations... that I can tell you.”
Respondent 4
Residents (Physicians) leave very early... they don’t work extra hours or if they do, they
call these hours overtime... when we did extra hours, these were, were, were... well done. I
never thought to claim for overtime to nobody... then there are people who, I think they start
to working exactly like past times but by reasons that would be they throw the towel (give up)
earlier and, and there is a higher percentage of people who say, well, this is going to become
in a, in a work rather than a vocation.
Respondent 13
Economic incentives were mentioned as a cause of crowding-out − 144 out of 157 times.
Having a statement that points out the existence of crowding out, the probability that this
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statement refers to some kind of economic incentive is high and close to 1. This is not
surprising and it is consistent with what the theory in economics and psychology predicts
([18], [38], [26] and [30]).
Besides economic incentives, control is the other main code related with crowding out.
We consider these two because all the times that any statement belonging to one of them
emerges in the course of an interview, it directly points out to crowding out. Furthermore,
the jointly appearance ratio of economic incentives (10/144) and control (10/21) is very
low. We interpret this low frequency in co-occurrence as an evidence of being independent
explanations or causes of crowding out.
Other codes which explain crowding out emerge jointly with economic incentives or
control frequently in the course of interviews. This is the case for instance of lack of
autonomy, ‘peonada’, market transaction, profesional career, damage to prosocial image or
bureaucratization.
Crowding-out
156
Control 21
Lack of
Autonomy 12
(21)
(12)
Economic Incentives
144
(144)
Lack of
recognition
45
(42)
‘Cafe´-para-todos’
31
(22)
Professional
Career 13
(6)
(13)
Change in Task
Meaning 68
(67)
Opportunistic
Behavior 21
(20)
Market
Transaction 17
(17)
‘Peonada’ 23
(15)
Damage to
Prosocial
Image 10
(10)
Bureaucratization
31
(31)
(10)
(8)
Figure 7: Relations Between Codes Referring to Crowding Out.
Figure 7, shows how the different codes related to crowding out interact between them.
Numbers within nodes refer to the number of statements belonging to the code of such a
node. Numbers between brackets out of nodes refer to the number of statements which
belong either to the code of the node and to the code connected by the arrow. For instance,
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Table 5: Crowding out.
Are there other reasons in combination of economic incentives
that reinforce the crowding out effect?
Code Economic incentives (144) Percentage
Task Meaning Change 67 46,52%
‘Peonada’ 15 (22,05%)
Opportunistic Behavior 20 (29,85%)
Market Transaction 17 (25%)
Lack of Recognition 42 29,17%
‘Coffee for all’ 22 (48,89%)
Bureaucratization 31 21,52%
Professional Career 13 9,02%
Damage to Prosocial Image 10 6,94%
Table 5: The number of times and the frequency with which the different codes appear
jointly with the main code of economic incentives and referring to crowding out. The codes
showed in the table below of task meaning change and lack of recognition, and justified to the
right, are those which appears most times joint with the code just above of them.
in the figure it can be seen that there are 45 statements showing lack of recognition, and,
at the same time, 42 out of these 45 also refer to economic incentives at the same time.
Table 5 displays how economic incentives combine with other codes in explaining crowding-
out. Two of these combinations are particularly interesting. The first is when economic
incentives combines with task meaning change. Task meaning change is present in 68 state-
ments and combines with economic incentives in 67 times out of the 144. The second is
when economic incentives combines with lack of recognition. Lack of recognition is present
in 45 statements and combines with economic incentives in 42 times out of 144.
From Social Psychology we know that recognition is one of the main determinants of the
intrinsic motivation ([28] and [30]). In the course of interviews doctors frequently showed
feelings about being poorly recognized by the actual effort they exert in medical practice.
They consider that the current system of rewards in SNS-O is far from recognizing their
work and effort as it should be. We capture such feeling with the code lack of recognition.
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The combination of lack of recognition and economic incentives seems to be an important
cause of crowding-out.
Other important cause in the explanation of crowding-out that combines with economic
incentives is task meaning change. Behavioral Economics [18] shows that incentives frame
the decision situation so as to suggest the appropiate behavior. When economic monetary
incentives are offered to doctors, they may change their subjective view towards work an
move their mind into an economic interaction frame behaving like an economic agent would
do, leaving out intrinsic motives.
In table 5, there are other codes containing information about the causes and the deter-
minants of task meaning change and lack of recognition. The first is related with ‘peonada’,
opportunistic behavior and market transaction. The second is related with ‘coffee for all’ 14.
Doctors frequently report about opportunistic behavior.Opportunistic behavior occurs
when agents act seeking her maximun monetary payoff regardless whether their behavior
contributes or not to the goal of the principal. More precisely respondents underline many
cases of opportunistic behavior in relation with ‘peonada’.
Market transaction − that refers to the change in the perception of the task from social
act to pure job − joint with ‘peonada’ and opportunistic behavior, are the three codes under
the change in task meaning that results from economic incentives. These codes explain
mainly crowding-out effect in SNS-O.
Finally, damage to prosocial image occurs when intrinsically motivated agents feel that
being monetarily rewarded may change the image that they project to the society and they
start to feel that society view them as greedy agents or, even worse, they start to view
themselves as greedy agents [40].
The mixing of economic incentives with task meaning change or lack of recognition are
the most explicative reasons for crowding out.
14A common expression used to describe situations where a group of individuals or institutions are treated
equally irrespective of their individual efforts, necessities or results.
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‘I perhaps don’t generate intentionally that waiting list. But there exists. As a consequence
I must be paid for two afternoons, that it is a gift and is money. I have no incentive to make
the waiting list to dissappear, and,... and I should have that incentive (incentive to reduce the
waiting list) because it would be a good thing that the waiting list would dissapear... is a good
thing, that means that we are working better.
Respondent 13
“[. . . ] waiting lists are absolutely overgrowth, and generate waiting list is very easy also
[. . . ] ‘peonada’, as an incentive? the problem is, rather than icentive I think that it can be a
perversion... of the issue.”
Respondent 3
In table 6 there are two other interesting codes. Bureaucratization on the one hand,
and professional career on the other. The first, reveals that the current contractual frame
under which the labor relationship between health professionals and health organizations
is established, is by itself a cause of crowding-out of economic nature. The second reflects
the fact that the SNS-O’s implemented incentive scheme called professional career, causes
crowding-out.
Related to bureaucratization doctors frequently referred to this process pointing out that
agents loss their interest towards medical profession and accomodate themselves and behave
as salaried public workers. Doctors describe bureaucratization as a process resulting from
treating all agents equally. The result of working in an environment without receiving any
incentive − neither monetary, nor non-monetary − which rewards professional excellence
or other merits.
In the case of professional career, however, doctors pointed out that professional career
fails as an incentive mechanism because its requisiteses are reached by all without doing any
effort (by the mere passage of time) and therefore, neither serve to recognize professional
achievements. Then the professional career currently implemented in SNS-O is viewed by
doctors as an economic complement that neither incentivize nor motivate and even worse,
may crowd out the intrinsic motivation of the highly motivated professionals.
“[. . . ] in the system that we are, I say... we are all equal and the equality is to go below.
That is, the equality is achieved down, never up. Then, when you spent some years, we all
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are paid the same, we leave the work with the same timetable, and you start to realize that
whether you view fourty patients and you write a research project, and you study, and you
publish. . . doesn’t matter, you are treated equal than the guy who is working besides you, the
same that you watch arriving to workplace at quarter to nine, that at quarter past two is
leaving, that shirks to asist patients...”
Respondent 15
...now, the professional career we have is also rubbish, because you seat at your chair for
fourteen years, and you advance [. . . ] I don’t go out of my office for a period of fourteen years
and I advance, [. . . ] Apart from the fact that if I go up of professional category is rewarded
by a infimun or mediocre economic incentive, which, at the end, you don’t do for that.
Respondent 13
Table 6: Crowding out
Control causes crowding-out.
Code Control (21) Percentage
Lack of Autonomy 12 57,14%
Table 6: the number of times and the frequency with which lack of autonomy emerges
joint with control referring to crowding out.
Control is the other main cause of crowding-out in SNS-O’s health organizations. How-
ever, it is of less importance than economic incentives. This minor importance of control
relative to economic incentives has to do with the fact that it is hard to control physicians
and their practice because they own a high amount of complex private information. Doc-
tors told that in many cases they perceived control from managers in some of their medical
practice. They often perceive the incentives or the policies implemented as ways to drive the
doctors towards managerial goals without taking into account doctors’ ones. Interviewees
also informed about a high degree of unilateralism in the decision making processes (setting
objectives, future planning,...) of health care and health organizations. This unilateralism
was felt as a lack of autonomy (12) that demotivates them.
“At the end of the year budgets are cut off...“there is not so much freedom ...” perhaps
“to do do many surgeries”, because the manager gives the order to control, and “cut off the
expenses.”
Respondent 6
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“[. . . ] in our culture to be tough, tough, and... to control... to be ‘controller’ authorizes you
more than other models of management of higher uncertainty. [. . . ] that kind of management,
I think that generates much resistence in collectives like this, in such qualified people, who don’t
want to hear from you what they must do and who they want that you leave them margin to
act. Then, there, there is a point of friction.
Respondent 16
Finally, we are going to put our results in relation to the crowding-out literature. Behav-
ioral Economics [18] and Social Psychology [31], establish several mechanisms through which
economic incentives may cause crowding-out of agents’ intrinsic motivation. The results of
this work fit with three of them: (i) incentives provide information about the principal who
implemented them, (ii) incentives frame the decision situation so as to suggest appropiate
behavior and (iii) incentives compromise control averse individual’s sense of autonomy.
Our results are consistent with the first mechanism. Doctors shape beliefs about the type
of management they are dealing with using incentive and payment schemes implemented in
SNS-O as informative signals. In the course of the interviews the lack of recognition (45),
profesional career (13), ‘coffe-for-all’ (31) and ‘peonada’ (23) throw confirmatory evidence
about the first mechanism. Information provided by pay structures and incentives help
doctors to ascertain management’s goals. We observe that doctors view health management
distant, disinterested, far from the doctors’ objectives and focused only in their own goals
(reduce waiting lists, reduce health expenditure, projecting a good image to the electorate
showing great interventions through the media and so on).
Doctors often made statements which evidence this first mechanism:
“Professional career is a... well is an overpay... that management invents to compensate,
to compensate a little. Then, is made without any criteria of quality...”
Respondent 14
“The major priority is the cost adjustment... as a function of the numeric valuation...
nobody questions himself if you are doing the things well or if you are doing the things wrong...
Respondent 4
“[. . . ] complementary actitvity earned (professional career) by category. And thus I am in
a hospital and thus I am... but here all is... here to extinguish the waiting list is all of the
picture. ”
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Respondent 9
The second mechanism refers to how the incentive can frame the health management-
doctor relation in a pure economic principal-agent interaction. When dealing with an eco-
nomic incentive, intrinsically motivated agents may change their mind starting to see the
activity or the task in which they are performing as an economic transaction. Such change
is what we capture with the codes task meaning change (67) and bureaucratization (31).
Rewarded to do extra effort or granted with fixed secure positions, doctors, might start per-
ceiving the social valuable task of helping others as a commodity subject to the labor market
rules, with wages and payments being the market price. This change in the perception may
disappoint them hurting their intrinsic motivation. This reason also lead us to include
market transaction (17) as another code with explanatory power. Codes like opportunistic
behavior (21) or ‘peonada’ (23) also provide evidence about this second mechanism.
Doctors told that in many cases colleagues start to behave following pure economic
motives in reaction to incentives or payment schemes:
“[. . . ] you just do the ‘peonada’ and after that if the waiting list fall or not... is not your
problem [. . . ] the problem is the waiting list by per se and no that the activity grows just
because. Of course if they tell you, ‘your activity have to increase’, you think,‘ok, ok, it will
increase but I can operate people who maybe do not... who is in the limit of the necessity to
be operated or not’
Respondent 2
“I don’t make ‘peonadas’ because I don’t believe... I don’t view myself in... that isue of
money. There are people, physicians, and no physicians, nurses, auxiliars and all the people,
who, given that ‘peonadas’ are so well paid, they start o think that to do one or two ‘peonadas’
per week compensates because are very well paid, and doing these is usefull for your expenses,
for your son’s university, or for any other thing. And that, perverts... perverts the system.
Perverts the system.
Respondent 8
Self Determination Theory ([31], [30]) establishes that this mechanism may occur in
strategic situations where incentives convey the desire of a principal to control the agent.
From this third mechanism we would expect that incentives may compromise control averse
doctors’ sense of autonomy. As doctors often told in the course of interviews, they view
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‘peonadas’, professional career or other managerial decisions as tools, designed unilaterally
by management, to drive doctors actions.
In doctors’ words, incentives, pay structures and managerial decisions which constraint
doctors’ autonomy or which were perceived as controlling may cause crowding-out :
“when we did ‘peonadas’, many of my mates... ‘but if I don’t want to do ‘peonadas’, after
be at work in the morning, I don’t want to be also at work in the afternoonÕ
Respondent 2
“ ‘Peonada’? within our unit, nobody wants to do. Because there are units that they want
to do. This also strongly depends on the units, But our unit, is a unit of women, practically,
there are two men only. And this, you know? women, children, married, anything else,... that
is... is different from men, eh. And thy don’t want to do ‘peonadas’. They don’t want. Young
people, that we talked about they before, I have some young people in the unit who what they
want to do is to research, to study, to do anything else... and they don’t want to spend the
afternoon here looking reviews which don’t add anything to you. Because reviews does not add
anything to me.
Respondent 15
3.3 Crowding In
The last category we test in this work is crowding-in. Interviewees made 172 statements
pointing out crowding-in. Figure 8 shows the distribution of these statements respondent
by respondent.
Figure 8: Crowding-out statements distribution respondent by respondent.
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Table 7: Crowding In
Are there incentives schemes, pay schedules or other non-economic rewards
which may cause crowding in?
Code Respondents 16 (%) Statements 172 (%)
Non-economic Incentives 16 (100%) 157 (91,28%)
Recognition 16 (100%) 49 (28,49%)
Autonomy 13 (81.25%) 50 (29,06%)
Professional Development 14 (87.5%) 38 (22,09%)
Research 10 (62.5%) 37 (21,51%)
Further Education 10 (62.5%) 29 (16,86%)
Economic Incentives 9 (56.25%) 15 (8,72%)
Service 8 (50%) 10 (5,81%)
Auto-Organization 8 (50%) 22 (12,79%)
Relatedness 7 (43.75%) 12 (6,98%)
Professional Career 7 (43.75%) 12 (6,98%)
Science 6 (37.5%) 17 (9,88%)
Flexibility 6 (37.5%) 16 (9,3%)
Teaching 4 (25%) 13 (7,56)%
Agree Objectives 4 (25%) 10 (5,81%)
Table 7: codes of crowding-in. The number of doctors who at least make one statement
related to each code and the percentage is shown in the second column. The third column
shows the number of statements referring to each code and the percentage.
Respect to crowding-in a fact that saturates rapidly is that it is mainly caused by
non-economic incentives. In the course of interviews just a few experiences of crowding-in
were explained. However a lot of proposals and ideas of crowding-in were proposed. This
inbalance offers a precise picture of the current state of health organizations in SNS-O.
Table 7 shows the codes related to crowding-in. The main code explaining this category
is non-economic incentives. Under this code all the statements which expressed proposals
or experiences of non-economic incentives were included. Non-economic incentives is also
related with almost all the other codes. That is, almost all statements included in it emerged
jointly with other codes among which recognition, autonomy, professional development, re-
search or further education seem to be the most important ones. All these codes or labels
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refer to incentive methods alternative to the economic incentives. Therefore all of these
methods should be considered in the design of new incentive schemes.
Recognition appears frequently in doctors explanations with the meaning of being a
potential and an effective incentive. In some cases also emerged jointly with economic
incentives as a way to complement these in order to change their nature from crowding-out to
crowding-in. Usually doctors claim for new incentives which will be useful to differentiate or
positively discriminate physicians following quality, excellence or other merit based criteria.
“we all are different, each one have his capabilities, his motivations, and that has to be
reflected, right? that is no, no. . . uniformity doesn’t stimulate, right? to. . . to the people, right?
that is. . . you have to recognize the differences.”
Respondent 2
“Sometimes is preferable to be pated on the back and be told what well you have done, this
year you operate a lot. . . and results have been excellent. [. . . ] that is, being told what well you
have done, being told, ‘hey!. . . do you want to go to this place to learn a new technique?’.”
Respondent 5
Giving more autonomy to professionals seems to be potentially another good non-
economic incentive. Doctors frequently asked for more autonomy to manage their work
at workplace and adjust the work burden to their personal circumstances and interests. To
offer this possibility as much as possible, could motivate physicians for work and encourage
their intrinsic motivation.
“. . . in the scope of the. . . of the autonomy. . .more freedom in management. . . in the man-
agement of your activity, that would be at professional’s level, as it is. Or at organization’s
level, you know? of how you manage yourself. . . ”
Respondent 4
“be able to manage the unit of service, that is to be able to deal managerial agreements
with the hospital management, in which you can make a proposal of this year plan, ‘we are
going to do that, with. . . ’ right?with this kind of incentives.”
Respondent 15
Research is another incentive which appears often in the course of interviews. Some
doctors refer to basic research others to applied clinical research, and a few told about the
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need for linking hospitals to the university as one big policy which would result in a better
quality of research, technical advance and scientific knowledge. Doctors refer to these issues
as ways different to the economic which could motivate them.
“It would not be necessarily monetary. . . instead of being told that they say to me, we are
going to disapear the waiting list and you will see all patients the next day, right? if you
achieve that goal, eh. . . we organize a unit of clinical trials, equiped with three nurses, two data
managers, and in addition we release the fifty per cent of two of your assistants. . . I watch
such a big carrot. . . ”
Respondent 13
Finally the last code that we shall analyze from table 7 is professional development. This
code reveals the limited possibilities that doctors have to develop a professional career, to
grow as physicians, expand their activities and knowledge and promote. In the interviews
they consider the expansion of these possibilities as a potential incentive which may boost
their intrinsic motivation.
. . . from that money a fifteen percent was extracted for the institution, and twenty per-
cent for the ‘residents’ fund’. That was a thing. . . that. . . that was, because the ‘residents’
fund’, what stimulates was that residents published, and present things. And then, there was a
congress, then what you present were watched and the interest in. . . travel expenses were paid
to him.”
Respondent 12
Remaining codes of the table 7 also explain many crowding-in features and also propose
many crowding-in incentives design. However we will analyze relations between codes to
establish which of them are catching the same or similar phenomenon. The first remarkable
thing is the prevalence of the non-economic incentives as the main cause of crowding-in.
The second is that the combination of economic incentives with recognition, also may cause
crowding in. Finally, we want to remark also that the redesign of the professional career
could transform this crowding-out incentive scheme into a crowding-in one.
Table 8 shows between codes relationships. That is, which codes appear at the same
time with a given statement in the course of interviews and also how many times appear
jointly and relative to the times that they emerge in total.
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Table 8: Crowding In
Are there incentives schemes, pay schedules or other non-economic rewards which may
cause crowding in?
Code Crowding-in (172) Percentage
Non-Economic Incentives 157 91,28%
Autonomy 45 28,66%
Self-management 21 46,67%
Recognition 43 27,39%
Research 36 22,93%
Science 13 36,11%
Professional development 36 22,93%
Further education 13 16,11%
Table 8: relations between crowding-in codes. The second column show the number of
statements of each code which appeared jointly with the code just above in the cases in which
they are more justified to the right. If the table show two codes equally justified, both relate
to the code less justified to the right which is above them. In the third column, percentages
are expressed relative to the code just in the row above, except the cases in which the just
above row code is equally justified. Then it is expressed relative to the code above it which is
less justified.
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Looking at table 8 we first say that the main code that may be on the basis of crowding-
in is non-economic incentives. From all statements referring to crowding-in, 91,28% of them
are pointing out to some kind of non-economic incentives. The rest of the codes which
appear in table 8 can be considered alternative ways to incentivize doctors without money.
Autonomy was quoted 45 times (28,66%) to be a non-economic incentive which may
cause crowding-in. Leaving professionals acting at the workplace with more freedom and
with a sense of behaving with autonomy seems to be a way to foster doctors’ intrinsic
motivation. More precisely, when doctors claimed for more autonomy often they claim to
self-management of time, task schedule or work goals and objectives.
Research activities also emerge often (22,39%) in the course of interviews as a potential
non-economic incentive. Research include the interest through science that share many of
the doctors. When they claim more research activities, sometimes they speak about clinical
trials, or facilities to spend research visits in other institutions, facilities to collaborate with
other research groups and to publish, research assistance or time to do research within
hospitals at working time.
Another form of non-economic incentive that doctors report is professional development
(22,93%). In doctors’ words, currently the possibility to develop a career into SNS-O is very
low and there are no facilities to professional development. In their view to set some criteria
in order to give opportunities to develop a career and push up doctors to grow as profes-
sionals is crucial to motivate physicians. Frequently, when they speak about professional
development they point out to further education.
Recognition is also something that doctors’ claim. Being recognized could be a good
non-economic incentive looking at doctors’ explanations. As we saw in the previous section
of this work, professional career is, in its current design, an incentive scheme that fails
to recognize the merits and/or the excellence of the professionals. Is an incentive that
treat equally all doctors: the “goods” and the “bads”. This lack of recognition is perceived
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Crowding-In
172
Non-economic
incentives 157
Professional
development 38
Autonomy
50
Research 37
Recognition
49
(157)
(36) (45)(36)
(43)
Self-
management 22
Further
education 29
Science 17
(21)(13)(13)
Figure 7: Codes are shown in ellipse form nodes. Rectangle form node show the category:
crowding-in. Connected with the category the figure shows non-economic incentives. Numbers
displayed within each node represent the number of quotes of each code. Numbers between
brackets displayed in arrows represent the number of times that a given code appears jointly
with the other code that is connected with it by the arrow.
negatively and hurts professionals’ intrinsic motivation. However, almost all respondents
believe that a well designed professional career, which will recognize the effort, the excellence
and quality, would do a lot in motivating doctors and pushing all the staff toward a norm
of good practice at high quality standards.
All the relevant relationships between crowding-in category and non-economic incentives
in their different forms is captured in figure 7.
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3.4 Crowding-in n the field: what it Is and what it should be
More insights can be drawn analyzing the normative or positive nature of statements and the
information that this classification provides to evaluate the degree of crowding-out within
SNS-O. As we explained above, all the statements drawn from the interviews were classified
into normative and positive. As normative we labelled hypothetical statements referring
to how things should be or could be in the SNS-O. As positive we labelled descriptive
statements that refer directly to the actual state of the SNS-O. We use this information to
determine if current management in SNS-O is causing crowding-out or not. Our approach
is as follows: if the fraction of all statements referring crowding-out that were classified
as positive is close to one, then it can be interpreted as evidence of management caused
crowding-out. This result will be more consistent if comparing with crowding-in if the
reverse happens.
We calculate the probability of having a positive (normative) statement knowing that it
is a statement referring to crowding-in for each respondent i = 1, 2, ..., 16, using the following
expression:
Pj(p|ci) =
Pj(ci|p) · Pj(p)
Pj(ci|p) · Pj(p) + Pj(ci|n) · Pj(n)
Where the p means positive, n normative and ci crowding-in. Then Pj(ci|n) will be the
probability for any normative statement of the respondent i of referring also to crowding-out
and Pi(n) will be the probability for any statement of respondent i of being normative15.
We also calculate respondent specific weights,
W ici =
sici
Sci
Where sjci refers to the number of crowding-in statements made by the respondent j,
15Analogously we have the other probabilities of the expresision: Pi(ci|p) will be the probability for any
positive statement of the respondent i that refers to crowding-out and Pj(p) will be the probability for any
statement of respondent i of being positive.
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Table 9: Crowding in
Measuring crowding-in degree in the SNS-O through probabilities.
Respondents Weight Probability Probability
positive (weighted) normative (weighted)
1 0.0606 0.0071 (0.0005) 0.9928 (0.0750)
2 0.0774 0.2551 (0.02818) 0.7448 (0.0822)
3 0.0723 0.1185 (0.0103) 0.8814 (0.0768)
4 0.0572 0.5000 (0.0290) 0.5000 (0.0290)
5 0.0690 0.0745 (0.0039) 0.9254 (0.0484)
6 0.0336 0.1000 (0.0023) 0.9000 (0.0209)
7 0.0555 0.0588 (0.0034) 0.9412 (0.0547)
8 0.0808 0.1997 (0.0162) 0.8003 (0.0651)
9 0.0740 0.1000 (0.0069) 0.9000 (0.06279)
10 0.0639 0.0986 (0.0051) 0.9013 (0.04716)
11 0.0454 0.5000 (0.0174) 0.5000 (0.0174)
12 0.0572 0.8105 (0.0612) 0.1895 (0.0143)
13 0.0707 0.1358 (0.0071) 0.8642 (0.0452)
14 0.0387 0.1000 (0.0023) 0.9000 (0.0209)
15 0.0808 0.5671 (0.0560) 0.4329 (0.04278)
16 0.0622 0.9140 (0.0425) 0.0859 (0.0039)
TOTAL 0.2837 (0.2929) 0.7162 (0.7071)
Table 9: Respondent by respondent weighted probabilities of having a positive/normative
statement conditional to being a crowding-in statement.
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and Sci refers to the total number of crowding-in statements drawn from the interviews.
Using weights we have the weighted probability of a positive statement conditional to be
crowding-in. Table 9 shows the probability of being positive/normative for any statement
or quote which refers to crowding-in. With these probabilities we want to measure the
crowding-in degree of the current management in SNS-O. Probabilities are calculated for
each interviewee, and then added to obtain the total probability weighting by respondent
or calculating the average.
Probabilities in table 9 show that crowding-in is, in words of the respondents, predomi-
nantly a normative phenomenum. The probability for a crowding-in statement to be norma-
tive is P (p|ci) ≈ 0.7. That is, when doctors make an statement pointing out crowding-in the
probability of such an statement of being some advice or opinion about how things should
be is near 70%. In other words, there is more work to do in fostering doctors’ intrinsic
motivation than is currently being done.
But fortunately this is not the whole of the picture. Looking the table 9 doctor by doctor
some remarkable numbers jump to our view. More precisely the probabilities corresponding
to respondents 11, 12, 15 and 16. The first two corresponds to two senior doctors who speak
openly about their experiences rather than of their ideas or ideals. Having spent long time
in positions with managerial responsibilities they were inclined to speak about succesfull
actions, organizative changes they implemented.
The case of respondents 15 and 16, however, is particularly interesting. During a period
of time, one of them held a management position at hospital and the other was head of a
unit. During this period they start to bargain and agree upon unit objectives and goals.
They were successful in reducing waiting lists without making ‘peonadas’. In words of the
respondent who was the head of that unit that was the result of giving to professionals
more autonomy and extend their working hours possibilities. Also, it was a consequence
of organizing autonomous teams and mutidisciplinary workgroups. These teams worked on
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each case at a high cooperation rate from a multidisciplinary approach. These changes,
change the mind and mood of the medical staff, they start to feel themselves part of the
picture because they also participate in objectives and goal setting process. Among these
objectives also managerial specific ones were included (waiting lists, reducing costs,. . . ) and
doctors commit on them, but in exchange they perceived more facilities to work in their
research projects, to attend conferences and courses or to publish papers. Many of their
statements described this.
The following quotes took from respondent 15 and respondent 16 may help to illustrate
this last case.
“. . . there where people who, eh. . . , that I knew that they were able to offer more from the
research point of view, or grants, or. . . and I gave to them more hours. . . to that. While other
people, were attending more patients. ‘You don’t want to do research. You don’t want to apply
for aid, so you will attend more patients. I am going to give more time to the ones for that to
the other. To give him more chances to do his things’, right? There I discriminated”.
Respondent 15
“What I try to do in the unit. . . is to offer to people much ability for, for,. . . that is, to
strengthen the development, right? the professional development. . . within the unit, there are
also non-economic incentives, but within the pathologies of, of. . . to give conferences, attend to
places (conferences) congresses, of. . . right?”
Respondent 15
“Free time is starting to appear joint with the work-life balance. Once the profession is
feminized, there is a new. . . even in men also, the issue of enjoying from. . . ... more auto-
organization (self-management) is starting to come. Is becoming a very important question.”
Respondent 16
4 Concluding Remarks
Doctors are intrinsically motivated toward medical practice because they express to like
and enjoy medicine. They are willing to put extra effort in profesional performance even in
absence of external rewards or in exchange of low ones. Vocation is another determinant of
doctors’ intrinsic motivation. Despite its incidence is lower than the like or the joy felt from
practicing medicine, vocation also makes doctors feel good from performing at health care.
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Doctors’ intrinsic motivation seems to have two dimensions. Doctors like or enjoy from
technical or scientific oriented tasks and also like or enjoy human or patient oriented tasks
of medical practice. Related with the former, doctors consider medicine as an attractive
profession because it involves activities like research, learning to acquire further education or
technical skills, improving methods and drugs, teaching and so on. With the latter doctors
express that they like or enjoy their work because they help people, they have to empathize
with patients in trouble or they work providing a social valuable good. To dedicate to such
activities at high effort lead them to develop a self-view of prosocial agents.
With respect to intrinsic motivation, we conclude that doctors motives to work well go
beyond the purely economic ones. Therefore the design of optimal incentive schemes should
take into account these internal motives which form doctors’ intrinsic motivation.
Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation are not independent. Then neglecting the
role played by the inner motivations of individuals in their behavior can lead to set per-
verse incentives and unexpected outcomes. Monetary rewards, economic incentives or other
extrinsic consequences like sanctions, or regulations, may hurt intrisic motivation. This is
the so called crowding-out effect that it is well established by behavioral and experimental
economics [18], [30] and [38].
In our study, doctors, in general, value economic incentives as negative, specially when
these come joint with a notorious absence of recognition. The current professional career
−an incentive scheme implemented in SNS-O− is considered demotivating by almost all
doctors in the interviews mainly because it fails to recognize good work and excellence
from other opportunistic behaviors. ‘‘Peonada’, another Fee-For-Service payment scheme
implemented in SNS-O is also considered demotivating because it sends a bad signal to
doctors about the type of principal and it changes the frame of the medical act and is a
source of opportunistic behavior. Furthermore, it clearly fails in the goal of reducing waiting
lists. ‘Peonada’ is also perceived as an attempt to control the professional activity.
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Control is the other main cause of crowding-out. Doctors are highly qualified profession-
als with a high private infrmation. These features make doctors control averse. Incentives,
or organizational issues may demotivate doctors because they often perceive them as con-
trolling or constraining their autonomy.
On the other face of the picture we have the crowding-in effects. Actions or external
rewards −mainly non-monetary but also monetary− which properly designed may boost
agents’ intrinsic motivation. In the study we find few exeriences and a lot of proposals of
crowding-in.
We sum up in two the most remarkable experiences. Measures and changes that provide
with more autonomy, more possibilities for doctors to self-manage their own activity, more
participation on the design of objectives and agree upon them, were the common features
of these experiences. In both they stopped making ‘peonadas’ and fixed the rewards to real
objectives that involved challenge. Other interesting characteristics of these experiences
were that the decision structure becomes less hierarchical and more participative and that
incentives −often non-economic rewards− were agreed between doctors and taking into
account their hopes, wishes and professional goals.
We sum up some proposals of changes and incentives made by doctors:
i.- Facilities to engage in scientific and researching activities: clinical trials, infraestruc-
ture, technical assistance, conferences attendance and so on.
ii.- Activities involving professional development: further education, stays in centers or
institutions of excellence to learn new and useful specific knowledge, teaching and the
like.
iii.- More autonomy to organize own work, to self-manage and to set and agree objectives
joint with colleagues and manageent.
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iv.- Recognition at workplace: the necessity of a renewed professional career designed with
clear criteria to reward professional excellence.
The last point above might need more exploration. The current professional career
implemented in SNS-O fails to recognize the good work, professional development, excellence
or quality of doctors outcomes. It is a source of dissatisfaction because it rewards equally
to all professionals independently of their effort, merits or results. It demotivates doctors
because they feel an absolute lack of recognition. But a widely shared claim of doctors is
to design a new professional career which fulfill this objective of rewarding −not necessarily
only with money− the meris, the professional development and quality of outcomes.
Finally, we want to underline that a very common claim from doctors is the need for
politically independent professional managers. If politically designed, managers have goals
far from doctors’ goals. Managers have short term goals, not beyond the legislature length
and politically focused. Contrary, doctors are career oriented agents intrinsically motivated
for work, with stable who have long term goals. This divergence lead to management to
design incentives that although may be well designed to meet its own objectives, are far
from being an incentive for doctors. This might be a source of doctors demotivation and
medical staff dissatisfaction.
A Codification
Codes related with intrinsic motivation and crowding effects are explained. Several ta-
bles in this section show a list of codes concerning to Intrinsic motivation, Crowding-out
and Crowding-in including the code name, the category the code is related to, the code
type: deductive, inductive oandr in-vivo. Finally a brief explanation of the code and some
argumentation about why the code is related with the proposed category is shown.
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Intrinsic Motivation and Crowding Effects: codes.
Code Related Category Type of Code Explanation of Code
Agree objectives Crowding in Inductive
A form of autonomy. Setting organiza-
tional goals jointly between agents and
principal motivates for work.
Altruism
Intrinsic moti-
vation
Deductive/Inductive
The willingness to help others although
this carries a cost. A theoretical con-
cept but also emerged from situations
described by doctors.
Attractive
profession
Intrinsic moti-
vation
inductive
Doctors’ statements mostly shown some
perception about medical practice as an
attractive activity, profession or task.
We consider all those statements as evi-
dence of intrinsic motivation and we cap-
ture all of them into attractive profession
code.
Autonomy Crowding in Deductive
In [25] the need for autonomy is con-
sidered, joint with the need for com-
petence, the basis for intrinsic motiva-
tion. Research on intrinsic motivation
[31], [30], have shown the benefits of sup-
porting autonomy for motivated persis-
tence, performance, and wellbeing.
Bureaucratization Crowding out Inductive/In-vivo
Emerged from participants. ‘Bureaucra-
tization’ reflect the idea that there is
a proportion of acommodated doctors
with high degree of conformism. Suffer-
ing from bureaucratization doctors give
up in the pursuit of their professional
goals. The consequence of achieving a
safe position ironcladed by a bulletproof
contract. The result of being polluted by
the absence of professional incentives.
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Code Related Category Type of Code Explanation of Code
Challenge Intrinsic motivation Deductive
SDT in [31], [28], [29] and [30] show
that intrinsically motivated people
is moved to act for the fun or chal-
lenge entailed rather than because
of external prods, pressures, or re-
wards. Intrinsic motivation is in
part the human inherent tendency
to seek out challenges, to develop
one’s capacities to explore and to
learn.
‘Coffee for all’ Crowding out Inductive/In-vivo
Emerges from respondents. ‘Coffee for
all’ is a cliche used by doctors to refer
to the equal treatment received for all
professionals independently of their in-
dividual effort, merits or professional ex-
cellence. It is used in a pejorative sense
to explain the lack of recognition suffered
by doctors from management. Closely
related with crowding out.
Control Crowding out Deductive
The opposite of autonomy. Rewards and
external regulation in general act as ex-
trinsic motivators which externally con-
trol people’s behavior. People behave to
attain a desired consequence such as tan-
gible rewards or to avoid a threatened
punishment. This type of extrinsic mo-
tivation has been extensively examined
and found to be undermining of intrin-
sic motivation [30].
Damage to pro-social image Crowding out Deductive
MCT [37], [38] and Behavioral eco-
nomics [16], [18], establish that reputa-
tion is a non-economic motivation when
people act following their intrinsic mo-
tives. In the provision of social valuable
goods agents wish to view themselves as
a social goal oriented. Money and re-
wards can hurt this self-view undermin-
ing people intrinsic motivation.
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Code Related Category Type of Code Explanation of Code
Dedication
Intrinsic moti-
vation
Inductive
Dedication label situations in which
good medical practice involves personal
costs. Doctors refer to some of this situ-
ations. Explicitly and also implicitly.
Economic Incentives Crowding out Deductive
Literature from economic theory [7],
[18], [38], and from psychology [26], [30]
has shown that the use of monetary or
material rewards to incentive workers
undermine intrinsic motivation.
Effort
Intrinsic moti-
vation
Inductive
Doctors frequently underline situations
in which they have to put extra effort,
out of hours and without any reward
linked. They commit to do that follow-
ing some sense of duty or ethical values.
They describe these situations as inher-
ent to the medicine and something that
one know before becoming doctor.
Empathy Intrinsic moti-
vation
Inductive
Empathy and the ability to empathize
is a crucial characteristic that all physi-
cians consider a good doctor should have
and from which they get satisfaction.
This characteristic refers to the ability
to put yourself (doctor) in the shoes of
others (patients) and feel their problems
or discomfort as own.
Flexibility Crowding-in Inductive
More flexible rules at workplace, in work
and tasks organization, or in the man-
agement of the organization in general
and of the consultation in particular.
Further education
Intrinsic
motivation/
Crowding in
Inductive
Respondents when openly talk about the
features and dimensions of the medical
practice that they enjoy the most they
point out some specific aspects. Further
education and the posibility to aquire
and learn new knowledge was quoted by
almost all of them.
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Code Related Category Type of Code Explanation of Code
Help Intrinsic motivation Inductive
This code emerges from respondents’
statements. They view themselves as
people who help others and contribute
this way to the social welfare. This way
to behave and feeling to be effective in
doing so is considered an internal reward
inherent to the medical practice.
Humanity
Intrinsic moti-
vation
Inductive
Often mostly respondents, when speak-
ing about their likings and their expecta-
tives from becominng and being doctors,
said that service and the human touch
involved by the profession is one of the
most valuable reward inherent to med-
ical practice. We capture these state-
ments under humanity code.
Lack of autonomy Crowding out Deductive
SDT[28], [30], establish that autonomy
in work decision taking is an important
source of intrinsic motivation. When-
ever management practices and imple-
mented incentives and command and
control policies are autonomy constrain-
ing, they may cause crowding out.
Lack of recognition Crowding out Deductive
SDT [30] establish that recognition
or being recognized by ones effort or
achievement is a more effective incentive
than the monetary for activities that in-
dividuals perform by the mere fact of en-
joyment. Analogously the lack of any
recognition undermines individuals in-
trinsic motivation to perform in any ac-
tivity.
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Code Related Category Type of Code Explanation of Code
Like/Enjoy Intrinsic motivation Deductive
Classical definitions of intrinsic motiva-
tion [31], [29], say that individuals are in-
trinsically motivated when they get sat-
isfaction (utility) from the very act of
doing a given activity or performing in
a task. Intrinsically motivated activi-
ties were defined as those that individ-
uals find interesting and would do in the
absence of operationally separable con-
sequences.
Non-economic in-
centives
Crowding in Inductive
Emerged from respondents and data col-
lection. This code collects all mentioned
forms of non-monetary rewards which
would be welcoed by physicians to im-
prove their work.
Market transaction Crowding out Deductive
Coming from MCT and SDT. Closely
related with Change in task view. Af-
ter being rewarded with money people
start to understand their work activity
and effort as a commodity that trade by
a price. Once they swift this view of
the activity intrinsic motivation is un-
dermined.
Opportunistic behavior Crowding out Deductive
Coming from Game Theory opportunis-
tic behavior is an expression convention-
ally used to refer such player’s actions
driven by the goal of seeking his own
maximun material benefit by gaming the
system or the rules, [16], [38], [45]. This
kind of behaviors in health is considered
as a consequence of crowding out of doc-
tors intrinsic motivation plus the huge
amount of the private information they
have performing in their positions.
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Code Related Category Type of Code Explanation of Code
Passion
Intrinsic moti-
vation
Inductive
Doctors in many of their explanations
explicitly. Other times passion is im-
plicitly present in the discourse when
they passionately talk about something
related to their work: a new treatment
or a surgery technique for instance.
‘Peonada’ Crowding out Inductive/In vivo
Emerged from respondents and data col-
lection. The code Peonada’ refers to
a certain Fee-For-Service (FFS) incen-
tive practice implemented in the Sis-
tema Navarro de Salud-Osasunbidea. Is
considered an ‘In vivo’ code because its
name exactly matches with the expre-
sion used by interviewees. This code ap-
pears closely related to crowding out.
Prestige
Intrinsic moti-
vation
Inductive
Often, in the course of interviews,
doctors speak about prestige matters
emerge as internal rewards different from
money.
Professional development
Intrinsic
motivation/
Crowding in
deductive
Asked about what they expect from
medical practice, doctors often point out
the possibility to develop a professional
career. Career concerns, prestige and
professional recognition also are shown
as incentives by physicians. This fact
keeps consistent with the model of ca-
reer concerns proposed by citedht, [33].
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Code Related Category Type of Code Explanation of Code
Professional
Career
Crowding out/in Inductive
Professional career is an existing incen-
tive scheme in the SNS. Although it is a
non-economicincentive, doctors perceive
consider it to cause crowding out. They
view professional career as a disguised
wage increase very easy to achieve for
every doctor. An element that no recog-
nizes neither merit nor effort. In these
cases appears as an evidence of crowding
out and also as a positive code. Other
times doctors’ mention professional ca-
reer as it should be. As a normative
code. in these cases they say that profes-
sional career should differentiate profes-
sionals who work hard and accumulate
merits from the rest.
Pro-social
Intrinsic moti-
vation
Deductive
Pro-social behavior and social prefer-
ences have been object of research within
behavioral economics [8], [19] and [36].
Prosocial behavior often involves inter-
nal non-material rewards and material
costs as doctors describe to frequently
happen in public health service.
Recognition Crowding in Deductive
[26], [31] pointed out that giving peo-
ple unexpected positive feedback on a
task increases people’s intrinsic motiva-
tion to do it. This was because the posi-
tive feedback was fulfilling people’s need
for competence. Recognition (social, pa-
tient, or employer) was claimed by re-
spondents in the study as a non-material
reward that enforce professionals’ sense
of competence and encourage physicians
to high effort and high quality standars.
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Code Related Category Type of Code Explanation of Code
Relatedness Intrinsic motivation/Crowding in Deductive
Theory and research suggest that relat-
edness, joint with competence and au-
tonomy, plays a role in the maintenance
of intrinsic motivation [28]. Relatedness
captures the idea that people’s effort and
achieved outcome is strongly correlated.
SDT hypothesizes that intrinsic motiva-
tion will be more likely to flourish in con-
texts characterized by a sense of secure
relatedness [51].
Research
Intrinsic motiva-
tion/ Crowding
in
Inductive
This code captures all the statements
that point out the importance that re-
search has for doctors. Research is con-
sidered of very importance by physi-
cians because new medical knowledge
improves quality of service, patients ex-
pectatives of sanation, citicens health
and social welfare. Further doctors con-
sider research as a challenge overcoming
activity and they find it enjoyable by its
own. Then facilitating research is viewed
as a non-economic reward that highly
motivates for work.
Science Intrinsic motivation/Crowding in Inductive
Respondents frequently mentioned that
scientific knowledge, scientific advance,
and science related issues are in the basin
of their interest and likings toward med-
ical profession. Under science we have
captured all these doctors’ motives. Sci-
entific adavance oriented incentives also
are asked by respondents and considered
as crowding in in many times.
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Code Related Category Type of Code Explanation of Code
Service Intrinsic motivation inductive
Doctors mostly afirm that service and
patient care were one of the main mo-
tives at the moment they decide to be-
come physicians. After they spent many
years of medical practice they confirm
this view and they still believe that pa-
tient care is one of the most interesting
and emotional dimension of being a doc-
tor.
Task Meaning Change Crowding out Deductive
Self determination Theory (SDT) [31],
[28], [29], andMotivation Crowding The-
ory (MCT), [37], [38], [18], both estab-
lish that one main reason for crowding
out is that once the money enter as an
exyternal reward for the performed ac-
tivity, people switch their perception of
performing in this task from the pure joy
to a mean of achievement of material re-
wards. After that change of perception
people only are willing to effort in the
activity when some reward is expected
as a consequence.
Technical knowledge
Intrinsic moti-
vation
Inductive
Respondents when openly talk about the
motives by which they decide to become
doctors, they point out some aspects of
the medical practice. One of the most
quoted of these was the technical dimen-
sion of medicine.
Vocation Intrinsic motivation Inductive
Emerged from interviews and data
collection. It was frequently high-
lighted by respondents as key factor
oin the choice of proffession.
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